The Power of the Weak: How Informal Power-Sharing Shapes the Work of the UN Security Council∗

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The current version of this paper is available at www.christophmikulaschek.com/powersharing/.

Abstract

To what extent is the work of international organizations shaped by their most powerful members? Can minor powers influence the decisions taken at these organizations? This paper presents the argument that great powers engage in power-sharing in order to attain unanimity inside international organizations, which enhances compliance and reduces the cost of implementing their decisions. An analysis of the UN Security Council tests this argument. Challenging the conventional wisdom that minor powers’ influence on the Council is negligible, this paper identifies a series of informal power-sharing practices, which promote consensus and augment minor powers’ influence far beyond what one would expect on the basis of the material capabilities and formal voting power of these states. The study relies on a novel design-based approach, which exploits exogenous variation in Africa’s participation on the Security Council to estimate the influence of African states inside this body. Non-parametric permutation tests and a qualitative case study show that African states have a substantial impact on the Council’s response to civil wars in Africa between 1988 and 2014. During years when a given African region is represented on the Security Council, the UN deploys an average of 920 more peacekeepers and allocates larger peacekeeping budgets to civil-war countries in that region than during years without a member of the Council from that region. This effect of a seat on the Council is particularly pronounced during major crises, when great powers are most eager to attain unanimity through power-sharing, and while minor powers benefit from the informal authority of the Council’s rotating presidency. Informal power-sharing inside international organizations such as the Security Council, motivated by the self-interests of powerful states, enhances the influence of minor powers.

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To what extent is the work of international organizations shaped by their most powerful member states? Can minor powers exert substantial influence on the decisions taken within these institutions? Three observers of the study of international organizations recently noted that “the consensus view is that small states do not affect IO behavior in significant ways” (Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, 2006, p. 56). The notion that states’ power is a reflection of their national capabilities has a long tradition, as does the argument that international organizations are merely fora for power-based interactions between their member states (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1994). Thus, Drezner (2007, p. 5) argues that a “great power concert is a necessary and sufficient condition for effective global governance over any transnational issue.” In a similar vein, liberal intergovernmentalism explains European integration in terms of the preferences of, and bargaining between Europe’s three most powerful states (Moravcsik, 1998). The rational design approach to the study of international institutions presents the related conjecture that asymmetries of member states’ power translate into differential control of the institution by its member states (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001). Proponents of the English school also conclude that great powers dominate international organizations (Bull, 1977; Hurrell, 2007, p. 11).

Several arguments form the basis of the conventional wisdom that international organizations are controlled by their most powerful members. Minor powers possess few attractive unilateral outside options for realizing the gains they could obtain through institutionalized multilateral cooperation (Katzenstein, 1985; Moravcsik, 1998; Stone, 2011). Even in international organizations with majority voting rules, minor powers’ strength in numbers does not enable them to change international regimes against the will of great powers since any attempt by the weak to impose their will on the mighty would lead the latter to withdraw their vital support from the institution (Krasner, 1985, p. 30). The ability of great powers to ‘go it alone’ may enable them to force minor powers to consent to multilateral cooperation even when such cooperation leaves the latter worse off than the status quo (Gruber, 2000).

At the same time, recent studies on international financial institutions (IFIs) and the European Union (EU) challenge the conventional wisdom that minor powers do not exert substantial influence inside international organizations. New empirical evidence shows that weak powers play a significant role in shaping the work of IFIs (Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, 2006; Copelovitch et al., 2013). Stone (2011) finds that great powers cede disproportionate influence in IFIs and the EU to weaker members during ordi-
nary times in exchange for the latters’ consent to the exercise of informal governance by great powers when great powers’ core interests are at stake. In the World Trade Organization, coalitions of minor powers have the capacity to block multilateral trade agreements (Narlikar, 2005; Lee, 2009). Weak powers also wield substantial influence in the EU (Mattila, 2006; Aksoy and Rodden, 2009). Credible veto and exit threats enable minor powers to influence decisions of the Council of the EU (Slapin, 2009; Schneider, 2011) and in the European Council (Tallberg, 2008). In conclusion, recent studies show that minor powers exert substantial influence on the work of IFIs and the EU, contrary to the conventional wisdom about international organizations.

This paper uses decision-making in the United Nations (UN) Security Council as a case study to examine whether the conclusion in the recent literature that minor powers wield substantial influence inside international organizations can be extended beyond IFIs and the EU, or whether the conventional wisdom about great powers’ dominance holds in the issue area of international security cooperation. The UN Security Council is a hard case for testing the proposition that minor powers exert a substantial impact on the work of international institutions, because five great powers have permanent membership and a veto right, and because decisions require positive votes from only four of the ten other member states, which serve on nonrenewable two-year terms.

This paper presents the argument that great powers engage in power-sharing in order to attain unanimity inside international security organizations, which enhances compliance and reduces the cost of implementing their decisions. Deliberations and decision-making in the Security Council follow a set of informal practices, which systematically depart from the institution’s formal rules and augment the influence of minor powers. The paper identifies five informal power-sharing practices through which great powers generate unanimity and minor powers gain substantial influence - despite their negligible voting power and small material resources. Minor powers wield particularly strong influence when major crises render the international security organization’s agenda highly salient, because it is at these moments that great powers are most eager to achieve unanimity by making concessions to minor powers even on unrelated issues. Minor powers’ influence also grows while they hold a privileged position in the organization to which Council members informally delegate authority, e.g. when they hold the Security Council’s rotating presidency.

To empirically test this argument, this study relies on a novel design-based approach to solve the identification problem posed by the fact that the UN Security Council’s
changing composition is not exogenously determined. While five great powers have permanent membership in the Council, the other ten members are elected in the UN General Assembly. This poses a challenge for causal inference: it may not be the influence of elected Council members that leads the Council to respond to the security threats that are most salient to these states, but rather the fact that states whose security threats are in the center of the Security Council’s attention seek election to this body.\(^1\) To solve the identification problem posed by the endogenous selection of temporary Council members, this study exploits the exogenous rotation of two Security Council seats between four African regions. To investigate the heterogeneity of minor powers’ influence, the study leverages the pre-determined rotation of the Security Council’s presidency as well as major events outside Africa that introduce variation in the salience of the Council’s work in other world regions and that are exogenous to the rotation of Council seats between African regions.

The paper finds that during years when an African region is represented on the Security Council, the Council responds more actively to civil wars in that region than it does during years when no state in that region is a member of the Council. An African region’s representation on the Security Council is associated with 920 additional UN peacekeepers per year that are deployed to civil-war countries in that region, on average. This effect amounts to more than half of the average number of blue helmets deployed to an African civil-war country. The rotation of Council seats has a similarly strong impact on the budget of UN peace operations in these regions. These effects are particularly pronounced during crises outside Africa, when great powers are most eager to secure African votes by making concessions on unrelated issues, and while African minor powers benefit from the informal influence of the Council’s presidency.

A qualitative case study on the UN Security Council’s response to the civil war in Somalia during Uganda’s term on the Council complements these quantitative analyses. The case study shows that Uganda wielded substantial influence on the Council’s decision to deploy a UN field mission in Somalia and to impose sanctions on Eritrea for supporting Somali rebels in 2009. Primary sources and interviews with diplomats who served on the Council indicate that Uganda’s influence can be explained by great

\(^1\)This endogeneity concern is similar to the one discussed in the literature on United States congressional committee influence (Ray, 1981; Rundquist, Lee and Rhee, 1996). Assessing the effect of serving on a committee is complicated by the fact that committees tend to be composed of congressmen whose districts are particularly affected by the work of the committee. A similar selection effect operates in elections of non-permanent Security Council members.
powers’ desire to secure Uganda’s vote on unrelated issues in order to attain unanimity on decisions that mattered most to great powers (e.g., Iran sanctions).

Great powers’ preferences cannot explain the variation in the UN’s response to civil wars found by this study, because we have no reason to believe that the preferences of the Council’s permanent members undergo regular swings in two-year intervals. At the same time, this result is not due to great powers’ indifference over multilateral intervention in Africa. Protracted diplomatic disputes about the UN’s role in Darfur and Libya are but two examples that show that the Council’s permanent members have intense preferences over African civil wars. The interests of these great powers partly stem from past colonial ties and present-day trade relations. The precedent set for other world regions when the UN intervenes in African conflicts and the fact that they bear half the cost of UN peace operations are additional reasons why the Council’s five permanent members are not indifferent about UN interventions in Africa.

This article makes several contributions. First, the finding that exogenous variation in minor powers’ participation in the Council has a strong impact on the deployment of UN peacekeepers challenges the conventional wisdom that the five great powers with a veto enjoy a near-monopoly on influence inside the Security Council. Second, this study sheds new light on informal governance in international organizations. While recent scholarship emphasizes the role of informal governance in strengthening great powers’ control over international organizations, this study shows that informal power-sharing practices can benefit minor powers. Third, the findings explain why minor powers intensely compete for seats on the Security Council even when they are not motivated by the desire to accumulate prestige (Hurd, 2002) or to obtain additional aid (Vreeland and Dreher, 2014). Finally, this study suggests that a future reform of the Security Council will change the work of the UN if the regional distribution of the Council’s membership is altered, even if no new permanent seats or vetoes are created.

This paper is organized as follows. Part 1 discusses decision-making inside the Security Council. The following part presents an original argument on informal power-sharing in the Security Council. Part 3 describes the design-based inference strategy for this study, and the subsequent part presents the results. Parts 5 and 6 summarize various robustness checks, sensitivity analyses, and a placebo test, which leverage original data on the budget of UN peace operations and on the size of UN civilian missions and non-UN peace operations. Part 7 presents the qualitative case study. The conclusion discusses implications for IR theory and for multilateral diplomacy.
1 Decision-making in the UN Security Council

The UN Security Council is responsible for countering threats to international peace and security, which take the form of interstate disputes, military aggression, civil war, mass atrocities, terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Frowein and Krisch, 2002). It has vast discretion in designating political crises or actions as security threats (Wellens, 2003; Matheson, 2006). The Council’s tool kit includes authorizing military interventions against aggressors, deploying peace operations, establishing transitional administrations, imposing sanctions, initiating criminal proceedings before international tribunals, and sponsoring crisis diplomacy efforts (Luck, 2006). The Council has fifteen members, five of whom are permanent (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The other ten members serve on this body on non-renewable two-year terms. The permanent members have the right to veto non-procedural decisions. The adoption of a resolution by the Council requires nine positive votes. These institutional characteristics make the Security Council a particularly hard case for testing the influence of minor powers on the work of international organizations. Their veto right, permanent membership, and preponderant national material capabilities put great powers at a formidable advantage in bargaining with minor powers that serve as temporary members of this body.

The conventional wisdom about decision-making inside the Security Council holds that the five great powers with veto power and permanent membership in the Security Council leave the ten other members with virtually no influence over that body’s decisions (see, e.g, Zaum, 2013, p. 70). Formal models of decision-making in the Security Council suggest that the body’s five permanent members monopolize almost all voting power (O’Neill, 1996; Winter, 1996; Voeten, 2001; Hosli et al., 2011, p. 171). O’Neill (1996, p. 235) pointedly concludes that, as far as voting power is concerned, “the Security Council has five members”. Formal models presented in Winter (1996, p. 820) yield the related insight that “the bargaining power of the nonveto members is effectively null.” Empirical studies concur with this assessment and characterize the Council as an elite pact between great powers (Voeten, 2005; Rosecrance, 1992; Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985, p. 501-4). The telling title of a recent book on the history of the Security Council refers to the five great powers with permanent membership as Five To Rule Them All (Bosco, 2009).

The conventional wisdom about the dominating role of the Council’s five perma-
nent members serves as motivation or premise for several recent studies. Hurd (2002, p. 41) reasons that since “effective decisionmaking power in the Council is monopolized by the Permanent Five” minor powers seek Council seats to attain status, not influence. Stojek and Tir (2014, p. 10) posit that “[c]learly, P5 states have a hold on Security Council decision-making and their interests ultimately drive the outcomes in the Security Council”. Allen and Yuen (2014, p. 1) concur that “[b]ased on previous research (Mullenbach, 2005), we know that the work of the Council is shaped by the interests and preferences of the five permanent members”. Johns (2007, p. 252, 255) characterizes deliberations in the Security Council as “controlled by a small number of states with effective veto power”. Finally, Passmore, Hart and Shannon (2015, p. 22) claim that “members of the P5 establish [UN peace operations] in countries where they have significant interests to protect”.

A different set of recent studies challenges the conventional wisdom that non-permanent Council members lack influence in the body’s decision-making. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) and Vreeland and Dreher (2014) show that great powers spend significant resources on bilateral and multilateral aid to non-permanent Council members in an attempt to buy their votes on the Council. Non-permanent members of the Security Council also receive loans with more lenient terms from the International Monetary Fund (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2009b, 2015) and from the Asian Development Bank (Lim and Vreeland, 2013), more favorable treatment by the World Bank (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2009a), and in some cases more aid from the European Union (Mazumder, McNamara and Vreeland, 2013) than other states. These studies ascribe such benefits of temporary Security Council membership to ‘global horse trading’ of minor powers’ votes in exchange for side payments by great powers. Clearly, great powers would not spend considerable resources to buy the favor of non-permanent Council members if minor powers on the Council had no influence on the body’s work in the first place, as the conventional wisdom would suggest.

The recent finding that great powers incur significant costs to woo non-permanent members of the Council raises an important question: Do the great powers on the Council merely offer side payments in the form of aid and loans to secure the non-permanent member’s votes or do they also compromise over the substance of the Council’s decisions in order to gain minor powers’ assent? Put differently, do non-permanent members trade away their entire influence in exchange for aid and loans or do they utilize some of it to impact on the Council’s substantive work? A recent
literature investigates the effects of temporary Council membership on economic and political outcomes in the member states (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010, 2013; Besley and Persson, 2011; Bashir and Lim, 2012; Voeten, 2014; Dreher, Eichenauer and Gehring, 2014), but it does not examine how their temporary presence in the Council influences the UN’s work. This paper systematically investigates that question.

2 Power-sharing as the source of minor powers’ influence inside the UN Security Council

States’ power inside international organizations can be understood as their ability to change the actions of other member states or the work of these organizations. Great powers engage in power-sharing in international organizations when they consent to formal or informal rules and practices in these bodies that allocate influence to minor powers that is disproportionate to their resources. In the issue area of international security, great powers have incentives to share power inside international organizations with minor powers. Power-sharing serves the purpose of ensuring that most states voluntarily cooperate with these organizations and comply with their decisions. Broad acceptance of the measures adopted by the UN Security Council is a prerequisite for giving effect to its decisions (Voeten, 2008; Krisch, 2008). In particular, the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by the Council depends on their universal implementation (Haufler, 2015). In turn, the Security Council regularly imposes sanctions to entice conflict parties’ compliance with its demands (Mikulaschek, 2014). Moreover, the five great powers with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council only contribute four percent of the 107,000 blue helmets who serve in UN peace operations, while other states field the remaining 96 percent (United Nations, 2015b). If the Security Council’s work consistently reflected the preferences of great powers and did not take into account the interests of minor powers, the latter would likely refrain from providing the necessary material and political support for the work of the Council (Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012, p. 36-7). Great powers would be able to coerce minor powers into compliance and cooperation, but doing so would require them to continuously incur the cost of coercion. However, it is less costly for great powers that seek to maximize their own utility to maintain international security organizations through power-sharing and

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2 This definition echoes the seminal definition of power in Dahl (1957) as the probability of getting the other to do what he would not have done otherwise.
voluntary cooperation than by enforcing the decisions of these organizations through coercion (Martin, 1993; Ikenberry, 2001).

In the UN Security Council, great powers engage in power-sharing by consenting to a series of informal practices, which systematically depart from the institution’s formal rules and augment the influence of minor powers. While the Council’s formal rules prescribe qualified majority voting and great power vetoes, the Council operates in accordance with practices that privilege unanimity among all Council members and the delegation of power to positions that are mostly occupied by minor powers. The choice of sharing power through informal practices - rather than by changing the formal rules - enables great powers to quickly adjust the extent of power-sharing in response to major world events that increase or decrease the returns from bolstering the influence of minor powers. Thus, governance in international security organizations differs from governance in international financial institutions, where informal practices increase great powers’ control and formal rules grant disproportionate influence to minor powers (Stone, 2011).

Three informal practices in the UN Security Council serve the purpose of attaining unanimity inside this body. First, the proponents of decisions consistently aim to secure unanimous approval. Consequently, 89 percent of all draft resolutions were adopted unanimously in the Council between 1988 and 2014. Second, during the same period the Council chose to issue almost four in ten decisions as Presidential Statements, which require the consent of all Council members, even though a qualified majority of Council members could have adopted the same texts as resolutions. Third, the Council delegates critical aspects of its work (such as imposing and enforcing targeted sanctions against terrorist groups) to its subsidiary organs, which decide by unanimity among all Council members. This practice led one Council member to refer to the Council’s committees in charge of UN sanctions as “the de facto executive branch of the Security Council” (United Nations, 2006a, p. 6). Unanimous approval of a decision signals universal support for the policy, which enhances the prospect of voluntary cooperation and compliance by actors outside the Council (Krisch, 2008). In turn, the practice of pursuing unanimity lends weight even to votes that are not needed for the adoption of a draft resolution under the Council’s formal rules. It thus enables minor powers

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3Thus, a British diplomat on the Council described the process by which the Council actually works as “generally hidden” and as different from its formal rules (Aust, 1991, p. 365).
4Author’s calculation based on UN voting records.
5For instance, delegation to subsidiary organs that require consensus has empowered individual members
on the Council to secure side payments, which may take the form of aid and loans to temporary Security Council members, and to influence the Council’s substantive work.

Through two further informal practices, authority is delegated to positions in the Security Council that are most frequently occupied by minor powers. First, great powers engage in power-sharing by allowing the Council’s president to influence the body’s work even though this practice mostly benefits minor powers, which hold the presidency most of the time. The president possesses almost no formal powers (Bai-ley and Daws, 1998, p. 130-1). However, the president’s de facto discretion exceeds her formal writ, as demonstrated in several instances when the president violated the Council’s rules out of political expediency. Council members frequently task the president informally with conducting consultations to reach consensus within the Council. Council members also allocate agenda-setting power to the president. Security Council presidents can launch initiatives on a preferred topic, which often shape the way the Council debates an issue and culminate in the adoption of new policies (Dedring, 2008, preface). Since the presidency of the Security Council rotates on a monthly basis among all fifteen members, it is held twice as often by a non-permanent member as it is occupied by a great power with permanent membership. Therefore, the non-permanent Council members benefit more from the practice of delegating tasks to the president than do the five veto powers.

Second, great powers on the Council engage in power-sharing by allowing non-permanent members to chair most of the Council’s sanctions committees (e.g., on the Council to block efforts to pressure sanctions targets even when those countries did not have a formal veto right (Rosand, Millar and Ipe, 2007, p. 10).

In January 1991, Zaire refused three Council members’ requests to convene an emergency meeting of the council on civilian casualties of Operation Desert Storm, even though it had no authority to refuse this request (Pilger, 2002; Bosco, 2009, p. 162). In December 2002, the Colombian president of the Council handed the highly sensitive documentation of Iraq’s nuclear program, which had been submitted to the UN’s weapons inspectors by the Iraqi government, to US diplomats even though he had been unsuccessful at obtaining the required approval by all Council members (Bosco, 2009, p. 228).

For instance, in late February 1991 the outgoing and incoming presidents (Zimbabwe and Austria) were entrusted with the task of consulting Council members about the terms of a resolution on the cessation of U.S.-led hostilities in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (Freudenschuss, 1994, p. 499). As president of the Council in October 2001, Ireland conducted a series of bilateral consultations to achieve unanimity on the Counter-Terrorism Committee that was established in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Doyle, 2004, p. 84-5).

During its presidency in January 1999, Brazil organized panels on different aspects of Iraq’s weapons programs and UN sanctions against Iraq, which yielded a report that presented a framework for the eventual return of UN inspectors to Iraq (Fonseca, 2011, p. 392). As Council president in June 2007, Belgium organized a series of debates and shaped a decision on the exploitation of natural resources in Central Africa (Genin and Fischer, 2007).
Al-Qaeda and ISIS) and working groups (e.g., on peacekeeping). Chairs of sanctions committees are “expected to play a leading role in forging consensus” among Council members (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand), 1995, p. 46). These positions allow non-permanent Council members to influence the Council’s substantive work.\(^9\)

In conclusion, the argument about power-sharing implies that the impact of minor powers on the Security Council’s work is disproportionate to their influence under body’s formal rules and minor powers’ capabilities. Power-sharing explicates the causal logic of the main hypothesis tested in this paper - namely, that minor powers have a substantial impact on the work of the Security Council (hypothesis 1).

The extent to which great powers are willing to make concessions to minor powers in order to achieve unanimity within the Security Council varies as a function of world events, which render the Security Council’s agenda more or less salient to great powers at different times. During crises great powers tend to be particularly eager to secure the unanimous adoption of their preferred policy by the Security Council. To achieve this purpose, they make concessions to minor powers on unrelated issues on the Security Council’s agenda in order to get the latter’s consent on the salient policy proposal. This implies that minor powers that serve on the Council at a time when the Council’s work is particularly important to great powers exert more influence on the work of the Council than minor powers that serve on the Council at other times - even on entirely unrelated issues on the Council’s agenda (hypothesis 2).

The informal power-sharing practices do not equally benefit all minor powers at all times. The de-facto power of the Council’s rotating presidency temporarily boosts minor powers’ influence inside this body. Therefore, I expect that minor powers with a seat on the Council have more influence on the work of the Security Council when they hold its rotating presidency than they do at other times (hypothesis 3).

9For instance, Austria’s chairmanship of the Iraq sanctions committee in 1991-2 enabled it to broker a compromise between Western and non-aligned members of the Council, to secure exceptions for humanitarian deliveries, and to augment the importance of the Austrian capital as a hub for the UN by hosting negotiations between the UN and Iraq (Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, 1993).
3 Design-based empirical strategy

This section explains the empirical test of the argument about minor powers’ influence on the work of the UN Security Council. It addresses, in turn, the identification strategy, estimation procedure, permutation tests, and the data. This paper relies on a design-based empirical approach, which rests on the identification of “opportunities where the causal factor of interest varies due to some ‘as if’ random manipulation” (Dafoe and Caughey, 2012, p. 10). Specifically, the study exploits exogenous variation in the participation of minor powers in the work of the Security Council.

3.1 Identification strategy and estimation procedure

Participation of African states in decision-making in the Security Council provides a natural experiment that can be leveraged to test the influence of minor powers in deliberations and decision-making processes in the Security Council. Ten of the Council’s fifteen members are elected for nonrenewable two-year terms through annual votes in the General Assembly. Every year, five outgoing Council members are thus replaced on January 1. Under a formula devised by the UN General Assembly in 1963, three of these ten non-permanent seats are reserved for African states (United Nations, 1963). The African Union and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, have decided that Central and North African states rotate one of these three Security Council seats every two years, that Eastern and Southern African states rotate the other seat every two years, and that the third African seat is always occupied by a West African state (Security Council Report, 2009). Figure 1 displays a map of the five African regions. This arrangement implies that Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa are represented on the Security Council for two years in a row and subsequently not represented for the two following years. This system of rotation between African regions has been consistently implemented since the 1970s.\footnote{In most years, African states reach an understanding to propose only one candidate for each Council seat that is reserved for an African region, effectively leaving the UN General Assembly with no choice but to elect this candidate (Vreeland and Dreher, 2014). In some years, two states from the same African region compete for a seat on the Council, and their contest is decided by a vote in the General Assembly or settled through negotiations (see, e.g., fn. 15). Even though African states in the same region compete over a seat reserved for that region, they never violate the principle of rotating seats between African regions. To clarify, the natural experiment consists in the rotation of Security Council seats between African \textit{regions} and not between individual \textit{states}.}
lists all Security Council members from the Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern African regions since the end of the Cold War. In conclusion, whether one of the four African regions is represented on the Security Council in a given year is pre-determined by a schedule that was devised several decades ago.

Since the temporal scope of the study is limited to the post-Cold War era (1988-2014) and thus starts more than 20 years after the rotation was established, it is reasonable to assume that the rotation of seats in the Security Council between the four African regions is exogenous to the outcome of interest, the influence of states in Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern Africa on the Council’s response to security threats in Africa since 1988. Covariate balance tests presented below confirm that characteristics of civil-war countries that may determine the baseline prospects of UN blue helmet deployments are not systematically different while they are represented on the UN Security Council than they are at other times.\footnote{Between 1988 and 2014 three states switched from one regional group to another: Mauritania shifted from Western to North Africa in 2004 (African Union, 2004), Rwanda from Central to Eastern Africa around 2002, and Angola from Central to Southern Africa in 1995 (Endeley, 2009, p. 41). These shifts did not allow these three countries to break free from the rotation principle, which ensures that each of them is only represented on the Council by a state from their region half of the time.}

If minor powers wield substantial influence inside the UN Security Council, exogenous variation in the representation of different African regions should have a visible effect on the Council’s work. Specifically, the Council’s decisions should align more closely with the preferences of states in a given African region during years in which that region is represented on the Council than in other years. In contrast, if great powers completely dominate decision-making inside the Security Council, as the conventional wisdom suggests, exogenous variation in the representation status of African regions should not affect the Council’s work. Thus, it is possible to evaluate the influence of African states inside the Council by comparing the outcome of the Council’s deliberations and decision-making processes in years with and without regional representation.

The identification of the effect of African powers’ influence on the work of the Security Council requires two assumptions about the preferences of Security Council members. First, the preferences of the permanent Council members are assumed not to systematically vary together with the representation status of African regions on the Council. The preferences of permanent Council members over UN intervention in Africa at a given point in time are thus independent of which African region is
Note: The map displays the five African regions (as of 1988) in different colors. Central Africa appears in light blue, Eastern Africa in grey, North Africa in dark blue, Southern Africa in dark red, and Western Africa in dark green. Western Sahara is administered by Morocco and does not form part of any region. Eritrea and South Sudan, which gained independence after 1988, are part of Eastern Africa. For the composition of the groups see Endeley (1998, 2009).
Table 1: North, Central, East, and Southern African members of the UN Security Council, 1988-2014

<table>
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<th>North Africa</th>
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<th>Eastern Africa</th>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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Note: In accordance with the rules established by the UN General Assembly, the Organization of African States, and the African Union, North African and Central African states rotate one Security Council seats every two years, and Southern African and East African states rotate another seat every two years. A third Security Council seat is always occupied by a West African state for two years at a time. This study examines the effects of rotation of the two seats between Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa. The table displays Security Council members in these four regions. Rwanda shifted from the Central African to the Eastern African group (see fn. 11).
represented on the Council. This assumption is plausible since there is no reason to
believe that the preferences of the Council’s permanent members over peacekeeping in
Africa exhibit a pattern of regular swings in two-year intervals. While the preferences
of the Council’s permanent members do not undergo cyclical changes, great powers
are not indifferent about peacekeeping in Africa either. They have multiple reasons
to be interested in whether, where, and when the Council deploys peacekeepers to
Africa. First, their colonial history makes two permanent Council members, France
and the United Kingdom, particularly attentive to conflicts in their former colonies in
Africa. Second, even the failure of a UN peace operation in a peripheral setting harms
the perceived authority and effectiveness of the Security Council in many unrelated
conflicts of vital importance to the five permanent members (Goulding, 1999, p. 163).
Third, UN intervention in African civil wars sets a precedent for UN intervention in
other parts of the world that affect the core interests of the five permanent members
of the Council. Fourth, the five veto powers bear more than half of the financial cost
of UN peace operations (United Nations, 2015a), which currently amounts to more
than 8 billion USD per year. Fifth, UN peacekeepers are a scarce resource. Therefore,
the opportunity cost of deploying blue helmets in Africa is high, because they could
alternatively form part of multilateral peace operations that respond to core national
interests of the Council’s five permanent members. The great powers with permanent
membership in the Council incur most of the burden of assembling a sufficient number
of troops by offering side payments to troop contributors (see Henke, 2012).

The second identifying assumption is that African states that temporarily serve
on the Council prefer the deployment of larger UN peacekeeping missions in response
to civil wars in their own region. This assumption can be justified as follows. Civil
wars generate negative economic externalities in the region where they occur, reducing
In fact, 87 percent of the economic cost of state failure, which often results from civil
war, materialize in countries that border the failing state (Hoeffler, 2010). Civil wars
also jeopardize political stability and peace in neighboring states. Recent scholarship
shows that states are more likely to experience an interstate or intrastate conflict if
a neighboring country is undergoing a conflict (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008; Gled-
itsch, 2002, 2007; Gleditsch, Salehyan and Schultz, 2008; Kathman, 2010). Refugee

\footnote{Note that North and Central Africa rotate a seat at the beginning of even years while Eastern and
Southern Africa rotate a seat at the start of odd years. Thus, electoral cycles in the U.S. and elsewhere
cannot explain the observed outcome across all regions.}
flows caused by civil war are associated with a higher risk of civil war in neighboring refugee-recipient countries (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). International peace operations reduce the risk of conflict contagion to neighboring countries by securing borders, by reducing transborder refugee flows, and by facilitating repatriation and resettlement (Beardsley, 2011). Moreover, UN peace operations have been found to increase the prospect of sustainable peace in civil-war countries, and large multidimensional peace operations have a particularly strong positive impact (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2013; Fortna, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). African members of the Security Council consistently express a preference for the deployment of larger UN peacekeeping missions in response to ongoing civil wars in their own region over inaction by the international community: between 1988 and 2014, the Security Council deployed thirty-three civilian or military peace operations in response to African civil wars during years in which the region of the civil-war country was represented on the Council, and in each case, the representative of that region voted in favor of establishing the peace operation. African states often express regret about the Security Council’s unwillingness to undertake more peacekeeping efforts in Africa. Preference outliers among African states, which are more hostile to UN peacekeeping in Africa, are consistently kept from being elected to the Council, and therefore the political preferences of African Security Council members do not perfectly align with those of African states, on average (Lai and Lefler, 2011, p. 32).

13 Author’s calculation based on UN voting records. This figure includes UN missions in West Africa.
15 The cases of Libya and Sudan exemplify this pattern. In 1995, Libya was elected to fill North Africa’s seat on the Council, but it withdrew before joining the Council “after prolonged agitation from the United States and others” in favor of neighboring Egypt (Pisik, 2000). In 2000, Sudan’s bid to represent Eastern Africa on the Security Council was derailed by Mauritius, another East African state, which won the vote in the General Assembly (Pisik, 2000). As noted above, the representation of African regions in the Council follows a strict rotation, but African states sometimes compete within their own region for a seat on the Council. Since 1988 only two countries in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa served on the UN Security Council while undergoing a civil war. In the fall of 1993, Rwanda’s lobbying for a UN peace operation in its own country had a decisive impact on the establishment of UNAMIR (de la Sablière, 2013, p. 101-2). During the first four months as a Council member in 1994, Rwanda obstructed this mission and filibustered the Council’s consultations on the subject (Keating, 2004; Kovanda, 2010). As the RPF rebels advanced, the Rwandan government changed its mind and called for UNAMIR to be reinforced in May (United Nations, 1994). The government subsequently formed by the RPF also favored a strong UN peace operation (Gambari, 2002). The Security Council decreased the size of UNAMIR during the Rwandan government’s obstructionist phase and increased it again in May. As a Council member in 1989 and 1990 Ethiopia did not favor the deployment of a UN peace operation in response to its own civil war. To the extent to which these two cases do not align with the assumption about the preferences of African Council members, they introduce attenuation bias. The results are robust to excluding them. These additional
On the basis of these two assumptions about the preferences of Security Council members, it is possible to test the first hypothesis on the influence of African Security Council members by comparing the average change in the size and budget of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in a given African region during years when this region is represented on the Security Council with the corresponding figure for years when no state in that region serves on the Council. If African states are able to influence the substantive work of the Council, they express their preference for UN peace operations by lobbying for more and better funded blue helmets in civil-war countries in their region. Consequently, the size and budget of UN peace operations in civil-war countries should increase at a higher rate when the region of the civil-war country is represented on the Council than at times when the region is not represented on the Council. The quantity of interest (average treatment effect) is the difference between the change in the size of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in an African region during months when the region is represented on the Security Council (treatment group) and the change in the size of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in an African region during months when the region is not represented on the Security Council (control group). This quantity can be expressed as

$$\Delta Y_T - \Delta Y_C = \frac{1}{N_T} \sum_{i_t \epsilon T} (Y_{i_t} - Y_{i_{t-1}}) - \frac{1}{N_C} \sum_{i_t \epsilon C} (Y_{i_t} - Y_{i_{t-1}})$$  

where $Y_{i_t}$ is the number of military and civilian personnel of UN peace operations deployed to any civil-war country in region $i$ in month $t$, $i_t \epsilon T$ designates the as-if-random assignment of African region $i$ to the treatment group in month $t$ under the rotation system devised in the 1960s, and $i_t \epsilon C$ designates the as-if-random assignment of region $i$ to the control group in month $t$, while $t - 1$ designates the month prior to month $t$, and $N_T$ and $N_C$ are the number of observations in the treatment and control group, respectively. Thus, the unit of analysis is the region-month, and the treatment status indicates whether region $i$ is represented on the Security Council during month $t$ or not. In line with the definition of the primary quantity of interest above, region-months are only included in the analysis if at least one civil war was ongoing in the region at the time. The secondary quantity of interest is the difference between the change in the budget of UN peace operations in civil-war countries in an African region during years when the region is represented on the Security Council results are available on request.
(treatment group) and the corresponding measure during years when the region is not represented on the Security Council (control group). The same equations are used to express this quantity, except that $Y_{it}$ is now defined as the size of the budget of UN peace operations deployed to any civil-war country in region $i$ in year $t$ and $Y_{it-1}$ is the corresponding figure during the year prior to year $t$. This analysis is conducted at the level of the region-year since the UN does not adopt monthly peacekeeping budgets. All analyses are conducted at the geographic level of treatment assignment, which is the region, in order to account for clustered treatment assignment to all African countries in the same region. Since the clusters vary by size, cluster totals are used instead of cluster means to avoid ratio-estimator bias (Middleton and Aronow, 2012; Dunning, 2012, p. 184-5).

To test the second hypothesis that minor powers’ influence on the work of the Security Council is larger when the Council’s work is highly salient to great powers than it is at other times I investigate the difference between the effect of African regions’ Council representation on the size of UN peace operations in African civil-war theaters during months when the Security Council’s agenda is highly salient and the corresponding effect during months when the Council’s work is less important. In addition to the two previously stated assumptions, this analysis rests on the additional identifying assumption that temporal variation in the salience of the Council’s agenda is not systematically related to the rotation of seats on the Security Council between African regions. Since this assumption may not hold for the the salience of the Council’s work in Africa, I only take into account variation in the salience of the Council’s role outside Africa. That variation is plausibly exogenous since there is no reason to believe that world events that render the Council particularly important in the Balkans, the Korean peninsula, or elsewhere outside Africa are a function of the rotating representation of African regions on the Council.\footnote{See Kuziemko and Werker (2006) and Vreeland and Dreher (2014) for justifications of the related but more demanding assumption that the salience of the Council’s agenda is exogenous to the composition of the set of individual states that serve on the Council.} The quantity of interest is a difference in difference: it consists in the average difference between quantity described in equation 1 during important years and the corresponding quantity during other years, and it can be expressed as

\[
(\Delta Y_{T1} - \Delta Y_{C1}) - (\Delta Y_{T2} - \Delta Y_{C2}) = (2)
\]
\[
\left( \frac{1}{N_{T_1}} \sum_{i \in T_1} (Y_{it} - Y_{it-1}) \right) - \left( \frac{1}{N_{C_1}} \sum_{i \in C_1} (Y_{it} - Y_{it-1}) \right) - \left( \frac{1}{N_{T_2}} \sum_{i \in T_2} (Y_{it} - Y_{it-1}) \right) - \left( \frac{1}{N_{C_2}} \sum_{i \in C_2} (Y_{it} - Y_{it-1}) \right)
\]

where \(T_1\) designates the as-if-random assignment of African region \(i\) to representation on the Security Council in month \(t\) while the Council’s non-Africa-related agenda is highly salient, \(T_2\) designates the as-if-random assignment of African region \(i\) to representation on the Council in month \(t\) when the Council’s non-Africa-related agenda is less critical, \(C_1\) designates the assignment of African region \(i\) to absence from the Council in month \(t\) when the Council’s non-Africa-related agenda is highly salient, and \(C_2\) designates the assignment of African region \(i\) to lack of Council representation in month \(t\) when the Council’s non-Africa-related work is less important.

The third hypothesis that minor powers wield more influence on the Security Council’s work while presiding over the body than at other times is tested by investigating whether the effect of African regions’ rotating Security Council representation on the size of UN peace operations is larger when the region’s representative also holds the presidency than it is otherwise. The timing of minor powers’ presidencies over the Security Council is exogenously determined, because the presidency rotates on a monthly basis among the body’s fifteen members in alphabetical order of their name. Thus, the quantity of interest is a difference in difference, which can be expressed as follows:

\[
(\Delta Y_{T_3} - \Delta Y_C) - (\Delta Y_{T_4} - \Delta Y_C) = \Delta Y_{T_3} - \Delta Y_{T_4} = (3)
\]

\[
\frac{1}{N_{T_3}} \sum_{i \in T_3} (Y_{it} - Y_{it-1}) - \frac{1}{N_{T_4}} \sum_{i \in T_4} (Y_{it} - Y_{it-1})
\]

where \(T_3\) designates the as-if-random assignment of African region \(i\) to the treatment group in month \(t\) while \(i\)’s representative derives an additional benefit from presiding over the Council, \(T_4\) designates the as-if-random assignment of African region \(i\) to the treatment group in month \(t\) without holding the presidency, and \(C_1\) designates the assignment of African region \(i\) to lack of representation on the Council in month \(t\).

Due to anticipation effects, the incoming presidents are also expected to benefit from the heightened leverage associated with the presidency. At the same time, some of the additional peacekeepers may only arrive in African conflict theaters shortly after the presidency ends. Therefore, the two months before and after the presidency are also part of the period during which minor powers are expected to derive benefits associated with presiding over the Council.\(^{17}\)

\(^{17}\)The results are robust to specifying different time periods (see below).
3.2 Permutation tests

The approach to causal inference that was chosen for this study is based on randomization tests, which make it possible to test the null hypothesis of no influence of minor powers on the substantive work of the Security Council with minimal assumptions. Unlike model-based inference strategies, this design-based approach does not require any parametric assumptions and avoids the risk of bias from incorrect assumptions about the error structure (Keele, McConnaughy and White, 2012).

If the null hypothesis is correct and minor powers do not have any influence on the Security Council’s work, the Council’s response to civil wars in Africa will be the same, in expectation, irrespective of whether the region of the civil-war theater is represented on the Council or not. Since the treatment is immaterial for the outcome if the null hypothesis is true, one should obtain outcomes that are similar to the observed outcome even if the treatment is randomly reassigned across observations. Permutation tests of the first hypothesis are conducted by randomly reshuffling the representation status of African regions in a given month across observations many times. To test the second hypothesis, African regions’ representation status on the Council and the salience of the Security Council’s non-Africa-related work are independently randomized in the same way. The test of the third hypothesis randomly reshuffles a binary indicator of whether a given African region benefits from holding the Council’s presidency. A large number of permutations of the data is generated for each test. The null hypothesis is tested by calculating a one-sided p-value on the proportion of permutations with a value of the test statistic that is at least as supportive of the alternative hypothesis as the average treatment effect observed in the original data (Pesarin and Salmaso, 2010; Dafoe and Caughey, 2012). If only a small number of permutations yield values that are as extreme as the observed value of the test statistic, the null hypothesis can be rejected with a high level of confidence. All tests account for clustering of region-month observations in region-two-year units, which correspond to Council members’ two-year terms.\footnote{This procedure is executed by constructing a matrix composed of three vectors. The first vector records the change in the number of UN peacekeepers from the previous month for each region-month observation. The second vector records the treatment status for each region-month. The third vector contains the region-two-year cluster ID of each region-month observation. Subsequently, the values of the second vector are randomly reassigned many times so that all units in the same cluster share the same treatment status, and the resulting matrices are stored. The analysis of UN peacekeeping budgets follows the same procedure, except that the first vector records the change in the budget from the previous year. The test of hypothesis 2 relies on a matrix with four vectors, which include two treatment vectors, whose values are independently}
To show that the results are robust to the use of alternative tests, all analyses are replicated through non-parametric bootstraps and Welch’s t-test, a parametric test of the hypothesis that the mean of the treatment group is higher than that of the control group.\textsuperscript{19} In addition, change in UN peace operations’ size and budget is analyzed with country fixed effects OLS models. Even though Welch’s t-test and the regression models rely on parametric assumptions and are more prone to bias than a non-parametric permutation test and bootstrapping if these assumptions do not hold, their results are consistent with those obtained from the permutation test and bootstraps. Tables 6 and 8 in the Appendix compare the results from permutation tests, t-tests, bootstrapping, and OLS models.

### 3.3 Data and variables

The main treatment variable indicates whether a given African region was represented on the Security Council in a given month. Data on this variable was obtained from the website of the Security Council, and it is displayed in Table 1. For each region-month observation, the binary variable takes a positive value if the region was represented on the Council in that month and zero otherwise.

The second as-if-randomly assigned treatment is the salience of the Security Council’s non-Africa-related agenda. Salience is measured by a proxy that indicates the number of New York Times articles with the words “Security Council” and either “United Nations” or “UN” during the most recent six months. To exclude articles on African security issues, articles that included the term “Africa” or the name of any African country that experienced armed conflict during the period of analysis or during the preceding two decades were removed. The search was conducted through the Lexis Nexis Academic database. On average, 175 articles on the Security Council’s non-Africa-related agenda were published in the New York Times. Months that fall below the mean are categorized as times when the Council’s agenda outside Africa was not highly salient while the others are classified as highly salient times. Figure 6 in the Appendix displays a time series for this variable.

\textsuperscript{19}Welch’s t-test is an adaptation of Student’s t-test, and it allows for possibly unequal variances of the treatment and control groups. The test also accounts for clustering at the level of regions’ two-year terms on and off the Council.
The third exogenous treatment is the Security Council’s rotating presidency. Data was extracted from the Security Council’s meeting records and coded for this study. When the region of a civil-war theater was represented on the Security Council, the likelihood that it also provided the body’s president was just below seven percent, because the presidency is alternately held by the fifteen Council members.

The outcome variables measure change in the number of personnel of UN peace operations deployed to civil-war countries from one month to the next, as well as annual change in the budget of UN peace operations in civil-war theaters. The study uses the conventional definition of civil war in Themnér and Wallensteen (2014). The data on battle-related deaths from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2015) was used to identify civil wars. Between 1988 and 2014, Eastern African states experienced civil wars during twenty-three years, states in Central Africa underwent civil wars during fifteen years, and Southern and North African states went through civil wars during eight and seven years, respectively. Table 3 in the Appendix lists these civil wars.

Twelve UN peace operations were deployed to civil-war countries in Central, Eastern, North, or Southern Africa between 1988 and 2014. All peace operations performed military tasks. Six of these peace operations were located in Eastern Africa, five in Central Africa, one in Southern Africa, and none in North Africa. Data on the actual end-of-month staff size of these peace operations was obtained from the website of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. On average, 2,068 persons were deployed to UN peace operations in civil-war countries in Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern Africa.

In addition to twelve UN peace operations, seven civilian UN missions were deployed to Central, Eastern, North, or Southern Africa during civil wars between 1988 and 2014. These civilian missions engaged in mediation, crisis diplomacy, and postconflict reconstruction, but they did not perform military tasks. Three civilian missions were located in Eastern Africa while Central hosted two. Two missions were located in North and Southern Africa, respectively. An original data set of the end-of-year staff

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20 Civil war is defined as one or several simultaneous disputes over generally incompatible positions that: 1) concern government and/or territory in a state; 2) are causally linked to the use of force, resulting in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths during a given year during the conflict; and 3) involve two or more parties, of which the primary warring parties are the government of the state where armed force is used, and one or several non-state opposition organizations. See Uppsala Conflict Data Program and International Peace Research Institute Oslo (2014, p. 1-3, 8).

21 Data is missing from this source prior to November 1990. These missing values were imputed from the official Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council and from other primary sources.
size of these missions was compiled for this study from reports of the UN Department of Political Affairs and from other primary sources. All UN civilian missions and peace operations are listed in Table 4 in the Appendix.

All peace operations and civilian missions were endorsed by the UN Security Council, which also adopted the mandates of peace operations and decided their size. The appropriation of funds for peace operations required the approval of the UN General Assembly to a budget prepared by the Secretary-General on the basis of Security Council’s decision on the tasks, size, and characteristics of the force. In 1987, a procedural reform weakened the General Assembly’s control over the Security Council’s budget (Woods, 1999, p. 51), and the General Assembly reviewed the budgets for peacekeeping operations “rather lightly” during the past three decades (Sagasti, Casabonne and Prada, 2007, p. 35). This means that the Security Council’s decisions and the Secretary-General’s steps to implement them, rather than the subsequent appropriation by the General Assembly, were the main determinants of the amount of resources available to UN peace operations. An original data set of yearly UN peace operations budgets was compiled for this study from more than 250 UN budget appropriations. Between 1988 and 2014, the UN spent an average of USD 182 million (in constant 2014 dollars) per year on peace operations in each civil-war country in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa.

Since the Council refrained from peacekeeping in African civil wars during the Cold War, the temporal scope of this study is restricted to the post-Cold War era (1988-2014). During the Cold War, the Security Council only deployed a single UN peace operation to Africa: the UN Operation to the Congo (1960-4). This mission predated the introduction of the system of rotating representation of African regions on the UN Security Council in 1966.22

After the Cold War peacekeeping in Africa became a central part of the Security Council’s agenda. At any given time between 1988 and 2014, 20,970 UN peacekeepers were deployed across Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa, on average. Over that period, 35 percent of all UN peacekeepers worldwide were deployed to peace operations in these four African regions. In recent years, this share steadily increased to 59 percent in December 2014. Between 1989 and 2014, almost five in ten dollars

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22During the Cold War, the Council was unwilling to intervene in African civil wars for two primary reasons. First, antagonism between the two veto-holding superpowers paralyzed the Council. Second, the Council was reluctant to engage in domestic armed conflicts. As superpower relations thawed in the late 1980s, the Security Council’s lethargy and its aversion to intervening in civil wars ended.
Figure 2: UN peace operations in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa, and worldwide, 1988-2014

Note: The figure on top displays the number of personnel in UN peace operations deployed in Central, Eastern, Northern, and Southern Africa (solid line) and worldwide (dashed line). The figure in the middle shows the total expenditure in constant 2014 US dollars for UN peace operations in these four African regions (solid lines) and across the world (dashed line). The figure at the bottom displays the size (solid line) and budget (dotted line) of UN peace operations in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa as a percentage of the size and budget of all UN peace operations in the world. During the entire post-Cold War era, almost one third of UN peacekeepers worldwide was deployed to Central, Eastern, North, or Southern Africa, and almost four in ten US dollars spent on UN peacekeeping financed peace operations in these four regions. During the 2000s, the share of these four regions steadily increased to 63 percent of the UN’s total peacekeeping budget and 59 percent of the personnel deployed to UN peace operations (as of December 2014).
spent on UN peacekeeping financed peace operations in one of these four regions; this share gradually rose to more than six in ten dollars by the end of 2014. Figure 2 displays the growth of UN peacekeeping in Africa.

4 Results

Despite being minor powers, African members of the Security Council wield substantial influence on the body’s substantive work. During months when the Council included a state from one of the four African regions with rotating Security Council representation, 59 additional peacekeepers deployed to civil-war countries in that region, on average. During months when an African region with rotating Council representation was not represented on the Security Council, 18 peacekeepers were withdrawn from civil-war countries in that region, on average. Thus, the United Nations deployed 77 more peace operations staff to civil-war theaters in an African region during months when that region was represented on the Council than it did when no state from that region had a seat on the Council. Over the course of a year, the average effect of non-permanent membership of African countries amounted to 920 peacekeepers, which is almost half the average number of UN blue helmets deployed to civil-war countries in the four African regions with rotating representation on the Council. This annualized effect corresponds to the size of an entire battalion. It is substantively very significant, because deploying more peacekeepers is associated with fewer killings of civilians (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2013), more cooperation by the warring factions (Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen, 2013), and greater overall success of the peace operation (Hegre, Hultman and Nygard, 2013; Kreps, 2010). A permutation test rejects the null hypothesis that minor powers in Africa cannot influence the substantive work of the Security Council (p<0.02). If the null hypothesis is assumed to be true and if the representation status of African regions in each year is randomly reshuffled many times, then we find that only 1.6 percent of all data permutations that are generated in this process display a positive effect of a region’s representation on the Council on the latter’s peacekeeping deployments in that region that is at least as large as the value observed in the actual data (see Figure 4). In short, random chance is a very unlikely explanation of the observed effect of an African minor power’s participation in the UN Security Council on the UN’s response to civil wars in the minor power’s region.

African minor powers’ participation in the UN Security Council also has a significant
Figure 3: Average effect of an African minor powers’ participation in the UN Security Council on the size and budget of UN peace operations deployed to civil-war theaters in the region of the minor power (1988-2014)

Note: This figure shows that more and better funded UN peacekeepers are deployed to African civil-war theaters when a state in the region of the conflict theater serves on the Security Council than when no state in the region has a seat on the Council. Rotation of two Council seats between four African regions as-if-randomly determines whether a given region is or is not represented on the Council at a given point in time. The panel on the left displays the average monthly change in the size of all UN peace operations in civil-war countries in a given African region during years when that region was represented on the Security Council and during years when no state in that region served on the Council, as well as the difference between the two means, i.e., the average treatment effect (ATE). The panel on the right shows the average yearly change in the budget of all UN peace operations in civil-war countries in a given African region in constant 2014 USD during years when that region was represented on the Security Council and during years when no state in that region held a seat on the Council, as well as the difference between the two means (ATE). 90% (in bold) and 95% confidence level intervals obtained through non-parametric bootstrapping (with region-two-year intervals that correspond to terms on the Council as clusters) are plotted around the point estimates.
Figure 4: Distribution of the observed ATE and the ATE in 200,000 permutations

Note: The four plots display the observed average effect of a seat on the Security Council held by a minor power as a red dashed line. This effect is the difference between the change in the size and budget of UN peace operations in civil-war theaters in a given African region when a state in that region serves on the Council and the corresponding quantity when the region is not represented on the Council. The four plots also depict the distributions of this effect we would expect to see under the null hypothesis, i.e. if minor powers did not have any influence on the Council’s work. These distributions were obtained from 200,000 randomly drawn permutations of the observed data. For the two upper plots, region-month and region-year data is permuted so that the same Security Council representation status is randomly assigned to all observations in the same region-two-year interval. If the null hypothesis is true, the chance of observing an effect on UN peace operation size that is at least as positive as the actual effect - simply due to random chance - is 1.6 percent (upper left panel). For the effect on UN peacekeeping budget size this likelihood is 6.3 percent (upper right panel). When the analyses are replicated at the level of treatment assignment, i.e. with region-two-year observations, only 2.4 percent of permutations display an effect on UN peacekeeping budgets that is at least as positive as the one observed in reality (lower right panel). The chance of seeing the observed effect on the size of UN peace operations or an even more positive one merely by coincidence is 3.2 percent (lower left panel).
effect on the funds allocated to UN peacekeeping in Africa. During years when the
Security Council included a state from a given African region, the budgets of all UN
peace operations in civil-war countries in that region increased by USD 53 million, on
average. In contrast, peacekeeping budgets declined by USD 17 million when no state
in the region of the civil-war theater serves on the Council. Thus, the average effect of
a single Council seat held by an African minor power amounted to an additional USD
70 million per year, which were allocated to UN peace operations in civil-war countries
in the African Council member’s region. This effect corresponds to 38 percent of the
average amount spent on UN peace operations in civil-war countries in Africa. It
is substantively important since increases in UN peacekeeping budgets are associated
with a strong decline in the risk of further armed conflict (Hegre, Hultman and Nygard,
2013; Collier, Hoeflller and Soderbom, 2008). A permutation test shows that this effect
is unlikely to have arisen by chance (p<0.07). The main results are displayed in Figure
3.

Minor powers wield a particularly large influence on the work of the Security Coun-
cil when the Council’s agenda is most salient outside Africa and when they hold the
Council’s presidency. These analyses leverage monthly variation in the exogenously de-
termined timing of the Council’s presidency and of major crises in other world regions;
since data on monthly change in UN peace operations’ budgets is not available, the
analyses focus on change in the size of UN peace operations. When a state in a given
African region served as the Council’s president (±2 months), the UN deployed 127
additional blue helmets to civil-war theaters in that region, on average.\footnote{This
result is robust to widening the window around the month of the presidency (thus
increasing the number of positive cases by one third) or to narrowing it (reducing
the number of positive cases by 40 percent). These additional results are available
on request.} In contrast,
the number of UN peacekeepers only increased by 26 when the region was represented
on the Security Council but did not hold the presidency. A permutation test suggests
that it is unlikely that we would observe such a strong positive difference in effects
(101 additional peacekeepers per month) simply due to random chance (p<0.1). This
result lends tentative support to the hypothesis that minor powers’ influence inside the
Security Council is partly due to the delegation of de-facto power to the institution’s
president. The informal influence of the president augments minor powers’ power in
the Council since the rotating presidency is held by a minor power most of the time.

When the Security Council’s work is very important in other world regions an
African region’s representation on the Council has a strongly positive effect on the
Figure 5: Heterogeneous effect of African minor powers’ participation in the UN Security Council by salience of Council’s agenda in other world regions and by Council presidency

Note: The plots compare the average monthly change in the number of UN peacekeepers for different subsets of the data. The upper panel shows that the effect of holding a seat on the UN Security Council tends to be particularly large at times when exogenous world events outside Africa render the Council very important. The panel below displays the added influence on peacekeeping deployments that is associated with holding the Security Council’s presidency, in addition to having a seat on it. 90% (in bold) and 95% confidence level intervals obtained through non-parametric bootstrapping (with region-two-year intervals as clusters) are plotted around each point estimate.
number of blue helmet the UN dispatches to civil-war countries in that region: a seat on the Council translates into 126 additional peacekeepers per month when Council’s agenda is highly salient outside Africa. Permutation tests show that these increases are significant \(p<0.02\). In contrast, the effect shrinks to 41 additional blue helmets and becomes statistically insignificant when the Council conducts few salient interventions in other world regions \(p<0.13\). Permutation tests of the difference between the effect during salient years and less salient years show that the chance of seeing an increase in the number of peacekeepers that is at least as large as the observed difference is less than 10 percent. This result provides suggestive evidence in favor of the hypothesis that great powers’ willingness to make concessions to minor powers - even on unrelated issues on the Council’s agenda - varies as a function of world events that render the Council more important during crises than at other times.

Variation in great powers’ preferences cannot explain the finding that minor powers’ influence is larger when the Council is more important outside Africa. Some factors (e.g., a new U.S. administration) may both render the Security Council’s non-African agenda more salient and increase great powers’ interest in UN intervention in Africa. This change in great powers’ preferences would imply that the number of blue helmets goes up across Africa when the Council becomes more important in other world regions. Therefore, it cannot explain why times of crisis outside Africa are only associated with a strong increase in the size of peace operations in those African regions that are represented on the Council. Instead, great powers’ concessions to minor powers with a seat on the Council to secure the latters’ consent to policies adopted in response to major crises outside Africa are the most plausible explanation.

5 Robustness checks

The results reported in the previous section hold in several robustness checks. First, the results reported above are robust to including annual data on seven civilian missions in addition to the twelve peace operations analyzed in the previous section. During years when a state in a region that experiences a civil war is represented on the Security Council, 911 more staff, on average, were dispatched to peace operations or civilian missions in that region than in years without a regional representative on the Council.
This difference is significant in permutation tests ($p<0.02$).\textsuperscript{24}

A second robustness check confirms that the results are not an artifact of troop contributions by the African state that temporarily represents the region of the civil-war theater on the Security Council, even though temporary membership in the Security Council often leads countries to contribute more blue helmets (see Bove and Elia, 2011, Voeten, 2014). For this test, the analyses in the previous section were replicated without taking into account blue helmets that were contributed by this African Security Council member. The size and significance of the effect of African regions’ representation on the number of UN peacekeepers remain unchanged (77 more staff per month; $p<0.02$). The results on the stronger effect during important crises outside Africa and while holding the Council’s presidency are generally robust to excluding these peacekeepers as well (see Table 6 in the Appendix).

A final robustness check shows that the results are not caused by serial correlation, and that they are not sensitive to the choice of region-months as unit of analysis: Since every non-permanent Security Council member serves on this body for two consecutive years, the treatment status of a given region in a given month is not independent of its treatment status during the previous month. Therefore, it makes intuitive sense to aggregate the data to the level of region-two-year units for a final robustness check.\textsuperscript{25} Aggregation reduces the number of observations by 95 percent, from 636 to 33, but it does not substantively alter the results.\textsuperscript{26} The average number and budget of UN peacekeepers sent to civil-war theaters in a region that was represented on the Council were significantly higher (by 1,948 staff and USD 208 million over the course of a two-year term) than the corresponding figures for two-year intervals during which no state in the region was a member of the Council. Permutation tests show that these differences are unlikely to have arisen merely by chance ($p<0.03$ and $p<0.04$ for UN peacekeeping budgets and size, respectively: see Figure 4 above).

\textsuperscript{24}Data on the budget of civilian UN missions and monthly data needed to investigate heterogeneous effects is currently unavailable.

\textsuperscript{25}Table 1 displays all region-two year units. Central Africa in 2008-9 and Eastern Africa in 2009-2010 are but two examples.

\textsuperscript{26}Permutation tests are particularly well-suited for analyses of small treatment and control groups (Keele, McConnaughy and White, 2012), such as this robustness check.
6 Covariate balance and placebo test

The ‘as-if-random’ assignment of the representation status of African regions on the Security Council implies that the pretreatment characteristics of region-months with and without regional representation on the Council are equal in expectation. The fact that the four regions rotate on and off the Council suggests that the treatment and control groups are balanced with respect to time-invariant variables that may influence the likelihood of UN peacekeeping (such as terrain and former colonial ties between the civil-war country and a permanent member of the Security Council). Even so, African civil-war parties or their external supporters might take into account the region’s representation (or lack thereof) on the Security Council in their planning, and they could thus pursue different strategies during years when a region is represented on the Council than at other times. Sensitivity analyses do not reveal any evidence of such strategic behavior (see Table 6 in the Appendix). Permutation tests do not show any significant differences between years when the region of the conflict theater was represented on the Council and years when no state in that region served on the Council on any of the following measures of warring factions’ behavior: the number battle-related deaths they inflicted, the rate at which they concluded or broke peace agreements, the extent of foreign troop support they received, or the characteristics of the governing regime.27

A placebo test addresses the concern that the sensitivity analyses summarized above cannot capture unobservables that might render the baseline probability of the deployment of international peace operations particularly high during years when the civil-war country’s region happened to be represented on the Council. If African regions were represented on the Security Council during years in which the baseline probability of international peacekeeping deployment was particularly high, we would expect that more non-UN peacekeepers were dispatched to civil wars during those years than during other years. On the other hand, we would not expect such a difference in non-UN peacekeeping deployments if the observed difference in UN peacekeeping deployments was due to variation in Africa’s participation in the Security Council’s deliberations and

27Data on battle deaths was coded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2014) and data on peace agreements was presented by Högbladh (2012). Due to limited data availability, the analyses of battle deaths and peace agreements are restricted to the periods from 1989 to 2013 and from 1988 to 2011, respectively. Data on political regime characteristics was coded by Marshall and Jaggers (2002) until 2013. The number of civil wars per region in which either side received foreign troops was only investigated for the period from 1990 to 2009, for which Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér (2011) coded this variable.
decision-making, because the rotation of UN Security Council seats should primarily affect UN deployments rather than peace operations of other organizations.

Between 1988 and 2014, 16 non-UN peace operations were deployed to Central, Eastern, and North African civil-war theaters.\textsuperscript{28} On average, these missions fielded 1,789 civilian and military staff to African civil-war countries, and they were thus similar in size to UN peace operations. The placebo test compares the average change in the size of these non-UN peace operations during years when an African region was represented on the UN Security Council to the corresponding figure during years when no state in that region served on the Council. As expected, the two means were very similar. When the UN Security Council included a state from the region where the civil war took place, non-UN peace operations increased in size by 512 persons, on average. When no state from that region was a member of the Security Council, the personnel of non-UN peace operations grew by 557 persons, on average. The insignificant placebo effect of 45 fewer staff for non-UN peace operations contrasts with the significant treatment effect of 920 additional UN peacekeepers who were deployed during years when the region of the civil-war theater was represented on the Council. While it is impossible to rule out that the difference between placebo effect and treatment effect is due to diverging logics of UN intervention and other interventions, the placebo test suggests that the Security Council’s particularly active response to African civil wars during years when the region of the civil-war theater was represented on the Council was not due to systematic differences between the pretreatment characteristics of African civil wars in the treatment and control groups. In conclusion, the sensitivity analyses and the placebo test rule out alternative explanations of the result on minor powers’ influence in the Security Council.

7 Qualitative case study

Qualitative evidence from a case study on Uganda’s role as Eastern Africa’s representative on the Security Council in 2009 and 2010 supports the argument on power-sharing in the Security Council. The case study investigates the return of a UN field mission to Somalia and the imposition of UN sanctions against Eritrea over its support to Somali

\textsuperscript{28}Civil-war theaters in Eastern Africa hosted ten non-UN peace operations. Five missions were sent to Central Africa, one to North Africa, and none to Southern Africa. An original data set of yearly changes in the size of non-UN peace operations was coded for this study from various primary and secondary sources. See Table 5 in the Appendix.
rebels during Uganda’s term on the Council. It shows that Uganda wielded substantial influence on the Security Council’s decisions on peace operations and sanctions in Eastern Africa, because great powers were eager to secure Uganda’s votes on unrelated issues. Inferences are made by triangulating evidence from primary sources and from interviews with Ugandan officials, including the country’s current prime minister, and with diplomats who represented other states on the Council during Uganda’s term.

Uganda’s role in influencing the UN’s response to the Somali civil war is a hard case for testing the power of minor powers inside the Security Council. First, realist scholars who view the distribution of power inside international organizations as mirroring the distribution of material capabilities would expect Uganda to have little power, because it is relatively poor and small even in comparison to other African countries that serve on the Security Council. Second, Somalia was an unlikely setting for a successful push by a minor power to deploy a UN field mission. This is because the UN never deployed a field mission to Somalia ever since the failure of its ambitious attempt to end the civil war in the early 1990s.

7.1 UN deployment to Somalia

Uganda had a vital interest in containing the Islamist insurgency in Somalia (Apuul, 2013) before it spread to Kenya’s coast, whose ports are the most important trading route for land-locked Uganda. Uganda’s government also feared the proliferation of Somali arms to Uganda’s unstable Northeastern Karamajong region (Parliament of Uganda, 2007). Therefore, Uganda became the first and largest troop contributor to AMISOM, the AU-sponsored peace operation deployed to Somalia in early 2007. AMISOM deployments were far behind schedule due to lacking funds (Among, 2007). In 2007 and 2008, the majority of Security Council members and the UN Secretary-General opposed deploying a UN peace operation to replace the faltering AMISOM

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29Uganda has the population size of an average African Security Council member, but its GDP and its per capita GDP amount to only a quarter of the corresponding mean among its African peers on the Council, and its military expenditures equate just 18 percent of those of the average African Council member (author’s calculation based on data from the World Bank and SIPRI).

30Additional motivations include Uganda’s desire to improve relations with its allies and donors. Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni reportedly said at an internal meeting that Uganda deployed its forces to Somalia in order to provide an exit strategy to its ally Ethiopia, which had conquered Mogadishu in December 2006 (interview with a participant in the meeting, conducted in Kampala on 22 July 2014). The intervention in Somalia also helped bolster Uganda’s image as a Western ally in the ‘war on terror’ (Fisher, 2012).
mission (Security Council Report, 2007; Charbonneau, 2008; Associated Press, 2008). Since Eastern Africa was absent from the Council, Somalia lacked a strong advocate among African Council members during these years.

When Uganda joined the Council, it closely collaborated with great powers on drafting all resolutions on Somalia that were adopted in 2009 and 2010.31 During its two presidencies, Uganda scheduled four Council meetings on Somalia to focus member states’ attention on Somalia, and it leveraged its position as chair of the Council’s working group on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa to draft the Council’s decisions on its cooperation with the African Union.32 Uganda did not push for a transition from the African Union’s mission to a UN peace operation but instead advocated the establishment of a UN mission to support and fund AMISOM, whose largest contributor was Uganda itself.33 During its first month on the Council, Uganda co-authored a resolution that established a UN field support mission in Somalia (UNSOA) with the mandate to bolster AMISOM (United Nations, 2009d). The resolution also spelled out the first Council mandate for the UN’s Nairobi-based diplomatic field mission for Somalia (UNPOS) (Hirsch, 2016, fn. 14). Remarkably, the resolution authorized support to AMISOM through the UN’s core budget, even though France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and other Council members who were large contributors to the UN budget were opposed to such an arrangement (Security Council Report, 2009c; Hirsch, 2016).

When Uganda became concerned about delays in implementing the resolution caused by some other Council members (Security Council Report, 2009a), it drafted a Press Statement issued by the Security Council, which called upon Council members and others to support AMISOM (United Nations, 2009a, c). The next month a donor conference for Somalia was held, and the reimbursement rate for AMISOM troops almost doubled (Williams, 2009, p. 519-520).

In 2010, Uganda co-sponsored resolutions that increased the size of AMISOM and broadened the scope of UNSOA’s support to AMISOM. In July 2010, AMISOM soldiers’ pay was increased by 50 percent and the mission’s rules of engagement were strengthened at Uganda’s request (Kasasira and Muyita, 2010). During the same

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31 Interview with Ruhakana Rugunda, Uganda’s former ambassador on the Council, conducted in Kampala on 17 July 2010.
32 Interviews with two Ugandan diplomats on the Council, conducted in Kampala on 17 and 21 July 2010.
33 Interview with Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, Associate Professor of Political Science at Makerere University, conducted in Kampala on 22 July 2014. See also United Nations (2009a, p. 17-8).
month, the UN established a regional base in Uganda, which was tasked with supporting all UN peace operations in Central and Eastern Africa. This decision was taken due to Uganda’s membership in the Security Council.34

By the time Uganda left the Security Council, UNSOA’s authorized size had grown to 249 UN staff (United Nations, 2011, para. 11). UNPOS’ personnel increased by 46 percent to 105 authorized posts over the course of Uganda’s two-year term (United Nations, 2010b, 2008a). The support for AMISOM Uganda secured from the UN enabled the mission’s staff to grow from 2,650 to 7,296 during Uganda’s two years on the Council.35 When Uganda’s term on the Council ended, it remained heavily engaged in Somalia. In May 2011, Uganda’s president and the UN Secretary-General’s special representative brokered the Kampala Agreement between the conflict parties, which extended the mandate of the transitional government by a year (Hirsch, 2016, p. 607).

7.2 UN sanctions against Eritrea over its role in Somalia

Uganda did not only use its influence in the Security Council to push for a UN field presence in Somalia, but it also took the lead in imposing UN sanctions on Eritrea over its role in Somalia. Eritrea supported Somali armed groups (United Nations, 2008b, 2006b) that opposed the government backed by AMISOM, Uganda, and Ethiopia, Uganda’s ally. In 2007, Ethiopia’s prime minister unsuccessfully tried to convince the United States government to support sanctions against Eritrea (Tesfamariam, N.d.). In May 2009, the Council of Ministers of IGAD, the organization of Eastern African states, called on the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Eritrea (Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2009).

In a meeting with her Ethiopian colleague in August 2009, United States ambassador to the UN Susan Rice deflected a request for American help by responding that any proposal to impose UN sanctions against Eritrea should be an IGAD initiative led by Uganda (Tesfamariam, 2011). Representatives of France and the United Kingdom concurred that African Council members should take the lead on UN sanctions against Eritrea when they met with their American colleague in September (Ibid.).

34Interview with a diplomat at Uganda’s mission to the UN in 2009 and 2010, conducted in Kampala on 22 July 2014.
During the same month, Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni met the United States’ ambassador to the United Nations, who endorsed IGAD’s proposal to sanction Eritrea (Ibid.). Uganda drafted the resolution that imposed targeted sanctions on Eritrea in December (United Nations, 2009b). IGAD members were the strongest backed of the resolution, while France, the United Kingdom, and the United States offered less active support.\textsuperscript{36}

\section*{7.3 What explains Uganda’s influence on the Council’s decisions?}

Why did great powers allow Uganda to influence the Security Council’s decisions on two issues of great importance to Uganda, even though its voting power in the Council and its material power were very small? Participants in the negotiations on the Council explain this pattern by great powers’ desire to secure Uganda’s vote on unrelated issues. In the words of Uganda’s representative on the Council, a minor power “gets courted by big powers, especially in search for votes for resolutions, and also courts them back to advance its interests ... Indeed, Uganda used its seat to successfully push the anti-Eritrea resolution” (cited in Tabaire and Okao, 2010, p. 7). When asked whether this characterization of bargaining on the Council matched his own recollection, a former representative of the United Kingdom confirmed that it did: “This is normal lobbying and interaction. It is part of the normal work of a committee. There is nothing unusual about that statement” by Uganda’s ambassador to the UN.\textsuperscript{37} Ambassador Günther Pleuger, who represented Germany on the Security Council in 2002 and 2003, agrees that this pattern is not unique to the time when Uganda served on the Council; he holds that in multilateral diplomacy around the Council’s horseshoe table “concluding deals across different issues is the most normal thing in the world.”\textsuperscript{38}

Why were great powers eager to secure Uganda’s vote? Diplomats answer that great powers consistently desire to reach consensus rather than pass resolutions with the qualified majority that suffices under the formal rules. A Ugandan diplomat explains that “the desire to keep the Council united is the driving force”:\textsuperscript{39} A Costa Rican diplomat who served on the Council during Uganda’s term concurs that great

\textsuperscript{36}Interview with a member of Uganda’s mission to the United Nations in 2009 and 2010, conducted in Kampala on 17 July 2014.
\textsuperscript{37}Phone interview conducted on 11 March 2015.
\textsuperscript{38}Interview conducted in Berlin on 18 February 2015.
\textsuperscript{39}Interview conducted in Kampala on 17 July 2014.
powers’ desire for consensus was the primary source of minor powers’ influence inside the Council. A Singapore’s former ambassador on the Council agrees that minor powers can gain leverage by threatening to break unanimity, and he concludes that the practice of unanimity levels the playing field between great powers and minor powers (Mahbubani, 2004, p. 258). A former ambassador of the United Kingdom confirms that the five great powers with a veto “always aim at consensus”, and that they “are always uncomfortable if they only get nine or ten votes” even though these votes are sufficient under the formal rules.

The most intensely debated issue on the UN Security Council’s agenda during Uganda’s term were sanctions against Iran over its nuclear weapons program. The five countries that joined the Council in January 2009 were expected to “influence the Council’s dynamics” on the Iran sanctions issue, because Turkey, Mexico, and Austria prioritized negotiations over new sanctions (Security Council Report, 2009a). After Russia had blocked the imposition of a fourth set of sanctions in 2008 (Pan and DeYoung, 2009), the United States and other proponents of new sanctions knew already at the start of 2009 that the Council would soon conduct fresh negotiations on Iran. Thus, the United States were concerned when Uganda’s president paid a state visit to Iran in May 2009 (Observer, 2009). Internal memos reportedly show that the United States embassy in Kampala worried about the implications of Iran’s promised investment for Uganda’s foreign policy decision-making (Butagira, 2011).

Negotiations in the Council on additional UN sanctions against Iran accelerated after President Obama secured Russia’s consent to discuss new sanctions in September (Cooper, 2009). Talks on specific sanctions measures started in February 2010 (Security Council Report, 2011). Several Council members including Brazil, Turkey, and Lebanon remained skeptical about new sanctions (Security Council Report, 2011). United States negotiators perceived a tension between seeking strong measures and maintaining consensus in the Council (Crawford et al., 2010). Faced with this trade-off, diplomats said that they were willing to accept weaker sanctions in order to build broad support in the Council (Richter and Stack, 2010). At a press conference in late March, President Obama (2010) summarized this approach: “Now, do we have unanimity in the international community? Not yet. And that’s something we have to work on.” Once the Council’s permanent members were in agreement, the position of

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40 Interview conducted in Princeton on 30 May 2014.
41 Phone interview conducted on 11 March 2015.
the ten elected members became a “key issue”, and great powers focused on consulting them (Security Council Report, 2010). A diplomat of a country that favored sanctions explained that “avoiding ‘no’ votes would make a big symbolic difference”, because the proponents of sanctions were eager to “display international unanimity” (Richter, 2010).

While Western great powers were eager to secure the votes of minor powers, Iran worked tirelessly to thwart this outcome. It hosted a conference on nuclear disarmament with sixty countries in Tehran in April 2010 (APS Diplomat News Service, 2010). The next month, Iran signed an agreement with Council members Turkey and Brazil, promising to send 1,200 kilograms of its Uranium to Turkey (IRIS, 2010). According to two Brazilian diplomats, the five veto powers on the Council objected to this agreement, which was reached after these great powers had agreed on imposing new sanctions.42 When Uganda’s ambassador to the UN met his Iranian colleague on April 20, Iran’s ambassador expressed the hope that Uganda would join Turkey in trying to help resolve the dispute without new sanctions.43 Three weeks before the vote on the new sanctions resolution, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to Uganda for a two-day state visit to discuss UN sanctions (Ntale, 2010). Iran offered to help Uganda build an oil refinery and to fund a tractor factory and a housing complex in an apparent attempt to sway Uganda’s vote (Ibid., Mulliro, 2010).

In the end, Uganda voted in favor of stringent new UN sanctions, which were imposed against Iran on June 9 (United Nations, 2010a,c). Thereby Uganda responded in kind for the goodwill great powers had displayed by allowing Uganda to influence the Council’s decisions on Somalia and Eritrea. This decision was consistent with a choice to influence the Council’s response to nearby crises while consenting to great powers’ policy choices on far-away disputes. A senior diplomat in charge of Security Council affairs at the French foreign ministry described this strategy in the following terms: “If you are Uganda, you are interested in the Lord’s Resistance Army, South Sudan, and the Horn of Africa, and not Iran and North Korea. I believe that there is a lot of diffuse reciprocity in the Council.”44 Even though Iran sanctions were not a highly salient issue for Uganda, its high-level bilateral diplomacy with Iran in 2009 and 2010

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42Interview with a member of Brazil’s mission to the UN during its term on the Council 2009 and 2010, conducted in Berlin on 18 February 2014. See also Uziel (2014, p. 10-11). United States Secretary of State called the agreement “a transparent ploy” to head off the UN sanctions the United States had been painstakingly pursuing for months (McManus, 2010).

43A meeting record prepared by a participant is on file with the author.

44Interview conducted in Paris on 5 August 2015.
signaled to great powers that they could not take Uganda’s vote on Iran sanctions for granted. Since the great powers sought the largest possible consensus and thus valued Uganda’s vote on this and other issues, they understood that the Council had to address Uganda’s most pressing concerns in return. Thus, Uganda voted in favor of sanctions on Iran without being pressured to do so by the United States (Vatanka, 2016).

Two alternative explanations of the UN’s deployment of a UN mission in Somalia are implausible. They are based on a change in the preferences of great powers and the UN Secretary-General, which might have coincided with the onset of Uganda’s term on the Council. First, the UN Secretary-General was opposed to deploying a UN field presence in Somalia before and during Uganda’s term on the Council; his position was due to the high risks associated with this mission and the aversion of his understaffed bureaucracy to take on additional tasks (Associated Press, 2008; Security Council Report, 2009a). Second, the incoming Obama administration, which took office twenty days into Uganda’s term on the Council, was less supportive of a UN field presence in Somalia than its predecessor; at her confirmation hearing in the Senate, the new American ambassador to the UN Susan Rice expressed skepticism about the merit of a UN deployment in Somalia (Kessler, 2009). Thus, concern about deteriorating piracy off the coast of Somalia did not increase American support for a UN field mission in Somalia in 2009. Similarly, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia were reluctant to give the UN a coordinating role on counter-piracy and did not seek a UN mission that would perform this task (Security Council Report, 2009a).

To summarize, Uganda influenced the Security Council’s decisions on two closely related security challenges in Eastern Africa: the civil war in Somalia and Eritrea’s support for rebels. This pattern can be explained by great powers’ desire to secure Uganda’s vote on unrelated issues, including UN sanctions on Iran, which mattered more to great powers than the conflict in Somalia while being less salient to Uganda than peace in the Horn of Africa. The case study provides suggestive evidence for the argument that great powers strategically share influence with minor powers in order to secure unanimity in the Security Council. The case study also shows that the argument has explanatory power beyond the scope of the quantitative analyses in this paper (i.e., the deployment of UN peace operations). First, it also explains the imposition of sanctions on states in the region of minor powers that serve on the Security Council (e.g., Eritrea). Second, the case study shows that in addition to
pushing for UN field missions (e.g., UNSOA and UNPOS) African Council members can also use their influence to lobby for UN support for regional peace operations (e.g., AMISOM).

8 Discussion and conclusion

This study presents the argument that great powers engage in informal power-sharing inside the Security Council in order to attain unanimity. Minor powers gain substantial influence through a series of informal practices inside the Council, which systematically depart from the organization’s formal rules. This argument challenges the conventional wisdom that the five great powers with permanent membership and a veto all but monopolize control of this institution. To test this argument, this study exploits the natural experiments of rotating UN Security Council seats and presidencies. When a given African region is represented on the Security Council, the UN deploys more blue helmets to civil-war theaters in that region than it does when no state in that region is a member of the Council, on average. Over the course of a year, the effect of a single Council seat held by an African minor power amounts to 920 additional peacekeepers, which corresponds to almost half of the average number of blue helmets deployed to African civil-war countries. African minor powers’ influence is particularly strong during crises, when great powers are most eager to attain unanimity through powersharing, and while minor powers benefit from the informal authority of the Council’s rotating presidency. Non-parametric permutation tests confirm that the effect of minor powers’ participation in the Security Council on that body’s work is unlikely to have arisen by chance. A qualitative case study on the UN’s deployment of a field mission in Somalia in 2009 corroborates these findings. While recent studies show that minor powers leverage a seat on the Security Council to secure more aid and loans from great powers, this paper indicates that minor powers also shape the UN’s response to security threats in their own region.

The findings of this study challenge the “the marked tendency in IR scholarship to focus solely on the most powerful players in an IO to the exclusion of all other actors. While this is often convenient analytically, it is equivalent to setting the weights for all of the neglected actors at zero.” (Lyne, Nielson and Tierney, 2006, p. 43) This study provides an estimate of the weight of minor powers in decision-making on peacekeeping inside the UN Security Council, whose institutional characteristics make it a hard case.
for testing the proposition that minor powers wield substantial influence on the work of international organizations. The findings do not support the realist argument that international organizations are “basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world”, and that their decisions are entirely shaped by great powers (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 7).

The findings also sheds new light on the role of formal and informal governance inside international organizations. While Stone (2011) shows that formal rules inside international financial institutions and the EU are biased in favor of minor powers while informal rules benefit great powers, this study indicates that the opposite dynamic unfolds in the UN Security Council. Since minor powers’ formal voting power and the formal authority of the Council’s presidency are negligible, only a systematic departure from these formal rules can explain why minor powers wield substantial influence on the Council’s work. The paper identifies five informal practices that systematically depart from the Council’s formal rules and augment minor powers’ influence inside this body. Thus, great powers do not merely exercise strategic restraint by establishing formal institutions (Ikenberry, 2001) but also through informal governance inside existing organizations.

The result that minor powers exert substantial influence on decisions to deploy and withdraw UN peace operations hints at a gap in the literature on the determinants of UN intervention in armed conflict, which tends to focus primarily on three sets of explanations: the demand for peacekeeping by warring factions, the human cost of hostilities, and the interests of the five permanent members of the Security Council (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2008; Fortna and Martin, 2009; Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012; Stojek and Tir, 2014). Future work on this research agenda should also consider the interests of Security Council members in the region of the conflict theater as an additional explanation of variation in the UN’s response to armed conflicts.

This paper is part of a larger research project, which shows that the findings reported in this paper also hold for the Security Council’s work in other issue areas and word regions. An analysis of the imposition and lifting of counter-terrorism sanctions, which leverages exogenous variation in the participation of Middle Eastern states in the Council, indicates that the Security Council imposes more - and lifts fewer - sanctions against Middle Eastern terrorist groups and senior operatives when a Middle Eastern country serves on the Security Council than it does at other times. Analyses of the deployment of UN blue helmets around the world show that the Council responds
more actively to civil wars when a minor power that is bordering the conflict theater holds a temporary seat on the Council - especially while that state holds the Council’s presidency.

The findings of this study have implications for the practice of multilateral diplomacy and for a future reform of the Security Council. They cast doubt on the the policy recommendation in O’Neill (1996) that states should not seek to join the Security Council as non-permanent members since members without veto power could not influence the decisions taken by that institution. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests a different conclusion: since non-permanent members of the Council exercise substantial influence on the substantive work of this institution the benefits of non-permanent membership may often outweigh the costs of campaigning for election to this body. Thus, even states that are not motivated by the desire to accumulate prestige (Hurd, 2002) or to attract the additional aid (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006) have an incentive to compete for a seat at the Council’s famous horseshoe table.

With respect to a possible reform of the Security Council, this study suggests that an increase in the number of Council members will change the substantive work of the Council if the regional distribution of the Council’s membership is altered. This implication holds even if a reformed Council does not include any additional permanent members and even if the reform does not increase the number of veto powers. The most prominent reform proposals entail a shift in the share of seats on the Security Council away from Europe and toward Africa and Asia (United Nations, 2004, para. 251-3). To the extent that some world regions will be more strongly represented on the Council than they are at present, the substantive focus of the Council’s work is likely to shift as well.
References


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## Appendix

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change in UNPO size</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-6,721</td>
<td>2,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in UNPO budget (in MM USD)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-561.5</td>
<td>503.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC representation</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC presidency ±2 months</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC salience: NYT articles</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>163.4</td>
<td>144.0</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>771.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of battle deaths</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>4,788</td>
<td>2,642</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>56,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil wars with foreign troop support</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New peace agreements</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace agreements broken</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic regime (avg.)</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>-4.80</td>
<td>-6.00</td>
<td>-7.50</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The table provides summary statistics for the region-months dataset, except for the change in UN peace operations budgets, which are adopted annually and therefore cannot be temporally disaggregated below the level of region-years. The measures of change in UNPO size and budget, battle-related deaths, foreign interventions, and new and broken peace agreements represent the sum of the respective measure for all civil wars in a region during the same month. The democratic regime measure indicates the median political regime characteristics for all civil-war countries in a region during the same month. Variation in the number of observations is due to the fact that some control variables have not been coded for the entire period of observation (see fn. 27) and missing values on democratic regime characteristics for some civil-war countries.
Table 3: List of civil wars in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa, 1988-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>UN peace operation</th>
<th>UN civ. mission</th>
<th>non-UN peace op.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1994-1999</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2000-2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1990, 2006</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1996-2000, 2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1988-1991</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1988-1991</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The table lists all countries in the four African regions with rotating Security Council representation that experienced civil wars between 1988 and 2014. It also indicates whether a UN or non-UN peace operation was deployed at any point during the civil war or in its immediate aftermath; peace operations that were established more than a year after the end of the civil war are not taken into account. See fn. 20 above for the conventional definition of civil war in Themnér and Wallensteen (2014) that is used in this study.
Table 4: List of UN peace operations and civilian missions in civil-war theaters in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa, 1988-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Civil war</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Max. staff size</th>
<th>Max. budget in MM USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>12/1988</td>
<td>5/1991</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>5/1991</td>
<td>2/1995</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>117.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>6/1997</td>
<td>2/1999</td>
<td>4,220</td>
<td>251.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOA</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>10/1999</td>
<td>8/2002</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOB</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>10/1993</td>
<td>6/2004</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Assist. to Burundi Peace Process Facilitator</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>3/1996</td>
<td>1/2001</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>11/1999</td>
<td>6/2010</td>
<td>20,819</td>
<td>1,444.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>7/2010</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>21,485</td>
<td>1,571.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>9/2011</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>10/1993</td>
<td>3/1996</td>
<td>6,138</td>
<td>361.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>4/1995</td>
<td>6/2013</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSOA</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>1/2009</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>458.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSOM</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>6/2013</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>7/2011</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>11,451</td>
<td>926.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIS</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>civ.</td>
<td>6/2004</td>
<td>3/2005</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>3/2005</td>
<td>7/2011</td>
<td>10,519</td>
<td>1,216.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>11/2007</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>23,466</td>
<td>1,928.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>6/2011</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>4,128</td>
<td>344.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table describes all 12 UN peace operations (PO) and 7 civilian missions (civ.) that were deployed during civil wars in Central, Eastern, Southern, or North Africa between 1988 and 2014. UN peace operations that were established after the end of the civil war are not taken into account. Missions are described as ongoing if they were in place at the end of the temporal scope of analysis in December 2014. For each peace operation, maximal budget size corresponds to the largest amount that was appropriated for a single calendar year (in million 2014 USD). Data on the budget of civilian missions is not yet available.
Table 5: List of non-UN peace operations and civilian missions in civil-war theaters in Central, Eastern, North, and Southern Africa, 1988-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Civil war</th>
<th>Intervening IO or state</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Max. staff size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>6/2005</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL RD Congo</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>7/2007</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUP</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>3/2011</td>
<td>10/2007</td>
<td>8,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>3/2007</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>17,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU NAVFOR Somalia</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>10/2008</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>1,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Ocean Shield</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>8/2009</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-piracy mission</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>10/2009</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>4/2010</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Nestor</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>10/2012</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAVSEC South Sudan</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>10/2012</td>
<td>1/2014</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5/2004</td>
<td>12/2007</td>
<td>7,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU support for AMIS</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5/2004</td>
<td>12/2007</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table describes all 16 non-UN peace operations and civilian missions that were deployed during civil wars in Central, Eastern, Southern, or North Africa between 1988 and 2014. Missions that were established after the end of the civil war are not taken into account. Missions are described as ongoing if they were in place at the end of the temporal scope of analysis in December 2014.
Figure 6: Measure of salience of UN Security Council’s agenda

Note: The figure displays the time series of the measure of the salience of the UN Security Council’s non-Africa-related agenda between 1988 and 2014. It shows a moving average over the most recent six months of the number of New York Times articles that refer to the UN Security Council without mentioning any African country that experienced a conflict since the mid-1970s. The means is depicted in red. Observations above the mean are months during which the Council’s non-Africa-related agenda was highly salient and are highlighted in grey. The plot also identifies crises that preoccupied the Council at times during periods when its work outside Africa was particularly important.
Table 6: Comparison of results of permutation tests, Welsh’s t-tests, and non-parametric bootstrapping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Average treatment effect</th>
<th>N obs.</th>
<th>N clusters</th>
<th>p (Perm. test)</th>
<th>p (Welsh’s t-test)</th>
<th>Bootstap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analyses of change in the size of UN peace operations’ staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of UNSC representation (hyp. 1)</td>
<td>77 PO staff/month</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of UNSC repres.: important periods (hyp. 2)</td>
<td>126 PO staff/month</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of UNSC repres.: less important periods (hyp. 2)</td>
<td>41 PO staff/month</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff-in-diff: Effect of UNSC repres. (hyp. 2)</td>
<td>83 PO staff/month</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of UNSC presidency (hyp. 3)</td>
<td>101 PO staff/month</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robustness: Incl. civ. missions (p.30)</td>
<td>911 PO staff/year</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robustness: Excl. regional staff (p.31)</td>
<td>77 PO staff/month</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robustness: Excl. regional staff: Diff-in-diff (hyp. 2)</td>
<td>87 PO staff/month</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robustness: Excl. regional staff: effect of pres. (hyp. 3)</td>
<td>87 PO staff/month</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robustness: Region-two-year units (p.31)</td>
<td>1,948 PO staff/2 yrs.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placebo test: non-UN (p.33)</td>
<td>-45 PO staff/year</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placebo test: UN (p.33)</td>
<td>920 PO staff/year</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyses of change in the size of UN peace operations’ budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main analysis (p.25)</td>
<td>USD 70 MM/year</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region-two-year units (p.31)</td>
<td>USD 208 MM/2 ys.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table displays the results of three sets of tests of the effect of exogenous variation in African regions’ representation on the Security Council on the size and budget of UN peace operations deployed in civil-war countries in these regions (average treatment effect). It shows that the p-values obtained from Welch’s t-test and bootstrapping are consistent with those obtained from a permutation test. Analyses of the staff size of civilian UN missions and of non-UN peace operations and analyses of UN peace operations’ budgets are conducted with region-year observations, because monthly data on these variables is not available. The other tests are conducted with region-month observations clustered in region-two-year intervals that correspond to a term on the Council. Since the UN does not adopt monthly budgets for UN peace operations and since budget data is not yet available for civilian UN missions and non-UN peace operations, the tests of hypotheses 2 and 3, the placebo test and some robustness checks are only conducted for the change in the size of peace operations’ staff.
Table 7: Covariate balance tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean in treatment group</th>
<th>Mean in control group</th>
<th>Difference in means</th>
<th>p-value (Perm. test)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comparison of months with and without a seat on the UN Security Council</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of battle deaths</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>6,493</td>
<td>3,577</td>
<td>2,916</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign troop support</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New peace agreements</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Democratic regime</td>
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<td>-4.62</td>
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<td><strong>Comparison of months with and without salient UN Security Council agenda</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of battle deaths</td>
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<td>4,694</td>
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<td>-0.74</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Comparison of months with and without UN Security Council presidency</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of battle deaths</td>
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<td>6,414</td>
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<td>-4.83</td>
<td>-5.14</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.40</td>
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Note: This table displays the results of covariate balance tests, which confirm that those characteristics of civil-war countries that may determine the baseline prospects of UN blue helmet deployments are not systematically different while they are represented on the UN Security Council, while their region benefits from the influence of the Council’s presidency, and while the Council’s agenda in other world regions is particularly salient than they are at other times. Permutation tests investigate the alternative hypothesis that the absolute value of the difference in means is significantly larger than zero; evidence of covariate imbalance is found if the null hypothesis is rejected. The tests are conducted with region-month observations clustered in region-two-year intervals that correspond to a term on the Council. The sole covariate imbalance detected in the 15 tests concerns the higher number of peace agreements broken when a state in the region of the civil-war theater presides over the Security Council; random chance is the most plausible explanation. The models shown in Table 8 show that the results are robust to controlling for this potential confounder. Note that the considerable (albeit insignificant) difference between the mean number of battle deaths during years when the civil-war theater’s region was represented on the Council and the corresponding average during other years is largely due to Ethiopia’s civil war in 1990, which is an outlier. Omitting it reduces the treatment group mean to 4,101 battle deaths and the difference in means to 524 fatalities. This difference in means is also insignificant.
OLS regressions

OLS models yield results that are fully consistent with those obtained from the permutation tests, bootstrapping, and Welch’s t-tests that are reported in the paper. The models in Table 8 summarize results from regressions that explain the effect of African regions’ representation on the UN Security Council on the number of UN blue helmets deployed to civil-war countries in those regions. Models 1-3 investigate the main effect of holding a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (hypothesis 1). Model 1 indicates that the UN deploys 50 more UN mission staff per month when a state in the region of the civil-war theater has a seat on the Security Council than it does at other times, on average. Model 2 shows that this result is robust to controlling for several characteristics of the conflict setting that determine the baseline prospects of the deployment of a peace operation. Due to the as-if-random assignment of the rotating representation of African regions on the Council, including these controls into the model is not necessary for causal identification of the effect of a seat on the Council. Model 3 shows that the results from the pooled regression hold when country-fixed effects are added to the model in order to hold constant all time-invariant observable or unobservable characteristics of civil-war countries.

Models 4-6 test hypotheses 2 and 3 on the heterogeneity of minor powers’ influence on the UN Security Council. During crises outside Africa, when great powers are eager to attain unanimity inside the Council by making concessions to minor powers even on unrelated issues (such as UN deployments to conflict theaters in their regional neighborhood), having a seat on the Security Council is associated with a strong increase in the UN’s responsiveness to African civil wars. At times when the Security Council’s work is less salient outside Africa, African minor powers only have a significant positive impact on the Council when they hold its presidency. The rotation of seats between African regions and of the body’s presidency is as-if-randomly determined, and the timing of crises in other world regions is plausibly exogenous to both. Therefore, the effects of sitting on - or presiding over - the Council at times when the Council’s agenda is highly salient and at other times is cleanly identified even in the model without controls (Model 4). The results from this model are robust to controlling for potential confounders (Model 5) and to adding country fixed-effects (Model 6).
Table 8: Results of OLS models of change in the size of UN peace operations, 1988-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNPO size</td>
<td>UNPO size</td>
<td>UNPO size</td>
<td>UNPO size</td>
<td>UNPO size</td>
<td>UNPO size</td>
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<td>50.57**</td>
<td>43.18*</td>
<td>9.86</td>
<td>5.06</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(24.21)</td>
<td>(22.99)</td>
<td>(24.73)</td>
<td>(18.03)</td>
<td>(13.12)</td>
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<td>UNSC presidency</td>
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<td>65.09***</td>
<td>63.18**</td>
<td>29.77</td>
<td>21.61</td>
<td>26.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(29.77)</td>
<td>(21.61)</td>
<td>(26.00)</td>
<td>(29.77)</td>
<td>(21.61)</td>
<td>(26.00)</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.26</td>
<td>-11.35</td>
<td>-16.64</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC repres. * imp. period</td>
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<td>74.71***</td>
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<td>52.01**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25.94)</td>
<td>(28.91)</td>
<td>(28.65)</td>
<td>(25.94)</td>
<td>(28.91)</td>
<td>(28.65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. The heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country. The four models with control variables are restricted to the period from 1990 to 2009, i.e. the period for which all controls have been coded. This explains the difference in N across model specifications (in addition to missing values for political regime characteristics). The coefficient of the number of battle deaths indicates the effect of an increase by 1,000 fatalities.